We use a unique data set of around 100 thousand reported insiders" share purchases across 15 European countries and the US to analyze the link between country-level shareholder protection and abnormal returns following insider trades. Our analysis shows that abnormal returns are positively correlated with country-level shareholder protection against expropriation by corporate insiders. We test two possible explanations for this positive relationship: information content hypothesis and substitution hypothesis. The data support the information content hypothesis that associates abnormal returns with the information conveyed by the trades to outside investors. Market reaction to insider purchases increases with shareholder protection because shareholder protection enhances transparency and trustworthiness of insiders" actions, limits possibilities for direct profit diversion and thus more information is eventually reflected in stock prices. We find rather limited support for the substitution hypothesis which conjectures that insiders in stronger shareholder protection countries substitute direct corporate rent extraction with insider trading profits. 
Introduction
Prior literature based on one-country samples documents significant abnormal returns following reported share transactions by corporate insiders, which suggests that insiders use their superior information about their firms when trading.
1 As the issue of insider trading has led to many controversies regarding the role and importance of insiders" transactions, an analysis of the link between abnormal returns after insider trades and country-level shareholder protection seems to be particularly appealing and important. This link is quite natural as corporate governance affects insider behavior and actions. At the same time, however, ample empirical evidence indicates that country-level corporate governance is the key factor shaping insider behavior (La Porta et al. (2000) ; Leuz et al. (2003) ; Doidge et al. (2007) ). Still, empirical evidence on the relationship is so far missing in the literature.
In this paper, we analyze this issue on a unique data set of reported insider transactions across 15 European countries and the US.
To draw predictions on how shareholder protection may influence price changes after insider trades, we would like to build on the discussion in the academic literature as well as arguments stemming directly from insider trading regulations. Perhaps not surprisingly, no clear-cut view prevails. Insider trading regulations in many countries around the world clearly prohibit trading on the basis of "material" and "non-public" information. The regulations are usually justified as providing fairness and equity (Bainbridge (2000) ) and, hence, they aim to limit rent extraction by informed inside traders at the expense of less informed outside investors. At the same time, however, regulators acknowledge that transactions by corporate insiders should be disclosed in a timely manner as they provide "a highly valuable source of information to investors" (EU Market Abuse Directive). 2 Academic literature also reflects the two arguments of rent extraction and information content. Ausubel (1990) , Leland (1992) and Fishman and Hagerty (1992) argue that insider trading transfers wealth from uninformed investors to informed insiders and results in adverse effects of insider trading on investment, liquidity and informational efficiency of the stock market. In a similar vein, Fried (1998) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) present abnormal trading profits made by corporate insiders as agency costs. In contrast, Manne (1966) and Carlton and Fischel (1983) stress the informational role of insider trading and argue that insider trading helps information to flow and stock prices to reflect private information faster. In support of the informational role of insider trades, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) document that insider trading increases the relative amount of firm-specific information incorporated in stock prices, and Aktas et al.
(2008) find that price discovery is faster on insider trading days.
An analysis of the link between investor protection and abnormal returns following insider transactions should therefore explore the two dimensions of rent extraction and information content. In this context, we consider two sets of hypotheses. First, approaching insider trading as a mechanism for rent extraction, better shareholder protection might curb insider trading and result in lower insider profits (the monitoring hypothesis). Alternatively, shareholder protection might curb only profit diversion by insiders directly from the firm and therefore leave open space for more rent extraction through insider trading and result in larger insider profits (the substitution hypothesis). Second, exploring the informational role of insider transactions for outside investors, we propose another set of opposing hypotheses: The ex-ante information hypothesis emphasizes the impact of good governance on better pre-event information environments that in turn has a diminishing effect on post-trade abnormal returns.
Alternatively, the information content hypothesis emphasizes the process of information incorporation into stock prices and conjectures that insider trades covey more information to outside investors in better shareholder protection economies reflecting lower overall profit diversion, higher corporate transparency and higher insider trustworthiness. Our empirical strategy is to see which of the hypotheses have support in the data.
Our analysis focuses on purchase transactions as they are, on average, much more likely relative to sales to be driven by non-public information and therefore they are more suitable for testing the rent extraction and information content explanations. Sell transactions tend to be motivated by diversification and liquidity needs rather than information (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee (2001) ; Fidrmuc et al. (2006) ; Rozanov (2009) ). 3 We choose to proxy the quality of shareholder protection with the anti-self-dealing index due to Djankov et al. (2008) .
The index is constructed on the basis of legal rules governing a hypothetical related-party transaction and as such it directly measures the ability of insiders to divert corporate wealth to themselves at the expense of outside investors. Hence, the index reflects the central aspect of corporate governance which is at the core of the arguments behind rent extraction and information content. In the context of our study, it is likely to shape both insiders" behavior as well as market perception of insiders" actions. Even though our data set covers only developed countries, sample variation with respect to shareholder protection is surprisingly high. The anti-self-dealing index ranges from 0.20 for the Netherlands to 0.95 for the United Kingdom (on a scale from 0 to 1), with the sample mean of 0.42 and the standard deviation of 0.22 which are not far from the mean of 0.44 and the standard deviation of 0.24 for 72 countries covered in Djankov et al. (2008) .
Overall, our results for over 100,000 purchases across 16 countries show that better shareholder protection against expropriation by corporate insiders is associated with higher post-trade abnormal returns. This is the case for event windows of 6, 11 and 101 days starting on the insider purchase day. Our results are unlikely to be driven by differences in insider trading laws and reporting requirements because recent regulatory changes in both the US and European Union resulted in the unification of insider trading regulation across all countries in our sample. 4 Also, our tests show that the results are robust to excluding from the sample all US transactions which constitute a relatively large fraction of our data set.
The positive relationship between shareholder protection and abnormal returns is consistent with both the substitution as well as information content hypotheses. Both explanations are equally plausible and might be in play simultaneously. We develop a set of further tests to differentiate between the two alternative explanations and we find more support for the information content rather than substitution hypothesis. The substitution hypothesis suggests more insider trading in stronger investor protection environments, while we find that the average number of trades per firm per year is not significantly different in weaker versus stronger shareholder protection countries, and the mean and median transaction value (and relative transaction value) is significantly higher in weaker protection countries. Furthermore, when we replace abnormal returns with abnormal profits (abnormal returns multiplied by the value of shares traded) as the dependent variable in our regressions to capture profits made by insiders and test the substitution hypothesis more directly, the anti-self dealing index becomes insignificant.
In contrast, we find support for the information content hypothesis. First, we show that the effect of the anti-self-dealing index is larger when information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors is likely to be larger: in smaller firms and in firms with lower analyst coverage. Similarly, the effect of the anti-self-dealing index is larger for larger transactions when more information might be conveyed. Second, decomposition of the anti-self-dealing index shows that provisions accommodating ease of proving wrongdoing with respect to selfdealing by insiders (e.g. ex-post protection) seem to be more important relative to disclosure requirements reflected in the ex-ante index. To support robustness of our results to alternative explanations potentially correlated with shareholder protection and abnormal returns, we discuss stock market efficiency, insider trading law enforcement, ownership concentration and executive remuneration. We find that our results are robust to all these alternative influences.
Overall, our results favoring the information content hypothesis contribute to the wider literature on the relation between corporate governance and equity returns (Morck et al. (2000) , Gompers et al. (2003) , Cremers and Naiar (2005) and Ferreira and Laux (2007)).
Understanding the link between shareholder protection and the way the market reads into information conveyed through insider transactions helps us comprehend the wider picture of why stock price informativeness differs across countries. Our analysis provides new evidence that stronger shareholder protection is an important factor contributing to prices better reflecting fundamental firm values. The result that rent extraction through insider trading finds weaker support in our data perhaps enforces the importance and effectiveness of insider trading regulations that prohibit trading on material information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the hypotheses in more detail, and Section 3 outlines insider trading reporting requirements and legal definitions in our sample countries. Section 4 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics while Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Hypotheses development
To develop our hypotheses on the link between shareholder protection and abnormal returns following share transactions by corporate insiders we look at two dimensions of insider trading. First, we look at insider trading as a channel of rent extraction and analyze how rent extraction through insider trading interacts with outright profit diversion from the company by corporate insiders. Second, we consider the informational role of legal insider trades and develop hypotheses on the basis on how investor protection shapes the firm"s informational environment and how it influences the way investors read into visible insiders" actions.
Shareholder protection curbs rent extraction by corporate insiders and results in less space for profit diversion. If the limits on exploitation of outside investors are wide reaching and curb also insiders" opportunistic trading on non-public information, insider trading might be less profitable with stronger shareholder protection. In the same vein, weak shareholder protection with lower insider accountability for their overall actions provides more scope for insiders to profit both from tunneling as well as insider trading. Therefore, the monitoring hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between shareholder protection and insider trading profitability. On a one-country level, Rozanov (2009) and Ravina and Sapienza (2010) show support for the prediction in the US looking at board and ownership structure and anti-takeover provisions, respectively. The substitution hypothesis, in contrast, argues that strong corporate governance limits insiders" direct private benefits extraction through profit diversion but does not reach as far as curbing insider trading activities. Therefore, insiders, who are not able to benefit from direct profit diversion, engage in insider trading that provides them with an alternative source of wealth extraction. Insiders in firms with weak corporate governance have more opportunities to divert corporate profits directly from their firms and therefore are not motivated much to engage in profitable insider trading. Cziraki et al. (2010) find support for this hypothesis in the Netherlands.
The monitoring and substitution hypotheses perceive the relationship between corporate governance and insider trading from a perspective of rent extraction by insiders. At the same time however, insiders" transactions (especially purchases) are followed by significant stock price adjustments that indicate that some new information is communicated to the market through the transactions. Given this market reaction to insider transactions, it is possible that shareholder protection affects not only motivations of insiders to engage in transactions enhancing their private wealth, but also relates to the way market perceives firm value enhancements signaled through the transactions. This is not to say that insiders are not motivated to extract rents. Still, as documented in the literature, insider transactions are valuable source of information concerning future growth prospects of their own firms and the firm value enhancement conveyed through insider purchases to outside investors could also be directly related to shareholder protection. In other words, in order to provide an overall picture of a relationship between shareholder protection and abnormal returns following insider purchase transactions, we should also consider the informational role of insider purchases for outside investors and its potential association with shareholder protection.
Viewing the relationship between shareholder protection and abnormal returns through the perspective of information conveyed in the transactions, we apply insights provided in theoretical disclosure models (Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) , Kim and Verrecchia (1991, 1994) and Verrecchia (2001) ). Overall, two alternative effects could prevail. First, a negative effect of shareholder protection might stem from shareholder protection improving disclosure standards and therefore increasing precision of information available to outside investors just before insider purchases, which leads to lower information content of the purchases themselves. According to Bailey et al. (2006) and Chung et al. (2010) , information asymmetries are in general smaller and prices reflect more public information in countries with stronger shareholder protection. Moreover, Leuz et al. (2003) suggest that governance provisions may improve financial transparency by mitigating insiders" ability and motivation to distort information disclosures. Thus, the ex-ante information hypothesis conjectures that higher information precision and more information incorporated in prices just before insiders" trades might be associated with lower price adjustments following insider transactions.
Second, price adjustments after information disclosures are also directly associated with the amount of information conveyed in the disclosures and the precision of that information. In case shareholder protection enhances transparency and trustworthiness of corporate insiders" actions, other things equal, an insider transaction may convey more news in better shareholder protection environments. Morck et al. (2000) show that among developed economies, price informativeness measured by firm-specific stock price variation is positively associated with investor protection. They further argue that "in countries that provide poorer protection for public investors from corporate insiders, problems such as intercorporate income shifting could make firm-specific information less useful to risk arbitrageurs, and therefore impede the capitalization of firm-specific information into stock prices… [reducing] firmspecific stock price variation" (p. 217). Rational risk arbitrageurs, knowing that they cannot predict where firm-specific abnormal profits will come to rest, invest fewer resources in predicting firms-specific abnormal profits and this results in less firm-specific information entering stock prices in economies where income shifting is easier (Morck et al. (2000) , p. Consistent with this mechanism we conjecture that, as insiders in countries with poorer investor protection have more possibilities to divert corporate profits, outside investors do not consider their reported actions as credible and containing much meaningful information for price discovery and, thus, stock prices adjust less after insider purchases. Insiders" actions might be considered as more transparent and credible in stronger shareholder protection countries and therefore insiders" trades might be associated with more information and larger stock price adjustments. "If insiders trade, the share price will move closer to what it would have been had the information been disclosed. How close will depend on the amount of "noise" surrounding the trade." (Carlton and Fischel (1983), p. 868) . We propose in line with Morck et al. (2000) that this "noise" decreases with shareholder protection. This information content hypothesis therefore conjectures a positive effect of shareholder protection on abnormal returns. Consistent with this mechanism, DeFond et al. (2007) find that the market reaction to earnings announcements is stronger in stronger shareholder protection countries. In a similar vein, Bailey et al. (2006) show that market reaction to earnings announcements is stronger after a firm cross-lists in the US documenting that stronger institutions in the US may increase credibility of information disclosure.
Insider trading laws and reporting requirements
The laws prohibiting trading on insider information are in place in all our sample countries. The key clause in the regulations in both the US and EU is that insiders must not trade on the basis of "material" and "non-public" information (Engle (2010) If the total value of the transactions does not exceed the threshold, the issuer reports to the exchange all transactions jointly no later than four trading days following the end of the month.
The stock exchange publishes on its website the information on the reported trades, but only on those that exceed the CHF 100,000 threshold.
In our view, insider trading regulations across all countries in our sample are of comparable very high standard and therefore our results are not likely to be driven by differences in regulations. However, in robustness tests we also consider the effect of enforcement of the regulations. According to Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) Even though all countries have experience with insider laws enforcement, it may be the case that some countries have higher tendency to obey law and therefore general law enforcement might be higher and affect our results. Our robustness checks control for the rule of law.
Furthermore, we also control for the effect of the adoption and enforcement of the Market Abuse Directive which may lead to some heterogeneity in the legal environment (Christensen et al. (2011); Dubois et al. (2011) ).
Data and comparative statistics

Data
The data on directors" trades are collected from several sources. For the US and UK we download our data from Thomson Insider Filings and Hemscott, respectively. 5 Data for the larger European countries come from Directors Deals Ltd. For smaller countries, we hand collect the data from local stock exchanges, securities and exchange commissions, or central 5 They are widely used in the literature, see e.g., Ravina and Sapienza (2010) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) .
banks (see Table 1 for details). In our analysis we look at purchase transactions only. It is well documented in the insider trading literature that purchases rather than sales are more likely to signal new information about firms" future prospects and have higher information content (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee (2001) classifications introduced by the data providers. As some of the other sources do not provide detailed classifications and refer to all holding increases (decreases) as "purchases" ("sells"), we screen them for non-open market transactions identifiable through additional notes on the trades. Moreover, to exclude all possible stock grants, option exercises and other transactions not at the market price, we delete all transactions with a reported transaction price that is 20%
higher or lower than the closing price on the trading date.
Individual directors may report multiple trades executed on the same day. In such a case, we add up the amount of shares bought and deduct the total amount of shares sold (if any). For Switzerland, as we do not have directors" identity we analyze all reported trades separately. Moreover, some announcements in the Polish data report trades executed over several consecutive days. In these cases, we take the date of the first trade as the transaction date. If the period for which the trades are reported jointly is longer than five days, the observation is dropped. All our data sources report individual transaction values in local currencies. We convert all transaction values to US dollars using the daily exchange rate at the date of the transaction downloaded from Datastream.
We measure stock price behavior around the director"s transaction date using daily US dollar stock returns that are adjusted for redistributions and stock splits. Because we do not have information on announcement dates for a few countries in our sample we compute abnormal returns after the trading date. Bearing in mind that the market reaction can be fully observed only once the trading is officially disclosed to the market, we define our event windows so that they are very likely to cover the announcement date. We also check the reporting gap between the trading and announcement dates (in calendar days) for countries with available data for both dates. The median lag is 0 days (immediate disclosure)
for the Netherlands, one day for the UK and Ireland, two days for the US, four days for Germany, Spain and Sweden, five days for Italy, eight days for Belgium, and 14 days for
France. As our shortest event window runs from the transaction date through to the fifth trading day that covers eight calendar days taking into account weekends, we include the announcement date in majority of trades in our sample even with the shortest event window. This relatively new index reflects protection against the ability of corporate insiders to divert corporate wealth for themselves and therefore fits our analysis very well. It quantifies the quality of legal rules governing a hypothetical self-dealing transaction between two firms controlled by the same person which aims to benefit that person at the expense of outside investors. Detailed variable definitions are reported in Table 2 . indicates that they purchase shares in relatively large firms. The average purchase transaction value is large also in France, the Netherlands, and Austria with USD 2.9, 1.2, and 1.1 million per transaction, respectively. It is very small in the Czech Republic (USD 45 thousand) and Slovenia (USD 52 thousand). In relative terms, directors buy the largest fraction of their firms in Germany (1.1% of market capitalization). The relative trade size is also high in Poland, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Insider purchases in the US are quite small both in dollar value as well as relatively to the market capitalization.
Comparative statistics
Slightly more than half (52%) of the trades in our sample are executed by executive directors. Even here, the variation across countries is relatively wide with Czech, German and Dutch executives being less active (12-23%) and Greek and US executives being more active as they participate in 75% and 66% of all purchase transactions, respectively. The bottom of Table 3 shows that even though directors do not trade more often in low shareholder protection countries, their transactions are significantly larger both in absolute and relative sense relatively to high shareholder protection countries. Moreover, trades by executive directors represent a larger fraction of purchase transactions in low shareholder protection countries. Table 4 reports firm characteristics for all firms with director purchases across the 16 countries in our data set and shows that variation across the countries is again large. In general, Belgian, UK, Irish and Spanish firms with insider trading are relatively large, while German, Greek, Polish and Swedish firms belong to the smallest in our sample. 8 The median book-tomarket ratio varies from 1.2 in Slovenia to 3.0 in Spain. The median analyst coverage ranges from 0 to 5 with the exception for Spanish firms that have a median of as many as 12 analysts.
Past stock performance shows that directors purchase shares after their stock lost on average 1.48% of their value over the last 100 days. This indicates that insiders are able to time their purchases and follow contrarian strategies. Figure 1 plotting the country average cumulative abnormal returns over the window from 20 days before to 20 days after the transaction shows that for majority of the countries abnormal returns decrease in the pre-trading period and then increase after the trade. Still, the mean past return is significantly positive in the Czech Republic, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland which suggest that the contrarian strategy is not pervasive across all countries in our sample. Overall, when comparing low versus high shareholder protection countries directors in low shareholder protection countries purchase shares in smaller firms with less analyst coverage and after less negative returns. Table 5 reports cumulative abnormal returns over 6, 11 and 101-day windows starting on the transaction day. The overall average market reaction over all three windows is positive and significant at the one percent level. With market adjusting on average by 1.4%, 1.9%, and 5.8% over the three horizons, the economic effect is also significant. For the 6 and 11-day event window, the market reacts positively in all countries except in the Czech Republic, France, Italy and Spain. The market reacts most strongly in the US and Poland. Longer-term abnormal returns over 101 days are on average larger than abnormal returns over 6 and 11
days, but they are insignificant in 6 out of the 16 countries. Nevertheless, no country performs significantly negatively in 101 days after the transactions. Overall, market reacts to insider purchases more in high investor protection countries relative to low protection countries for all horizons (all the differences are statistically significant at the one-percent level). In summary, the univariate statistics indicate that abnormal returns differ across countries with different shareholder protection. Also, they highlight the importance of controlling for firm and transaction characteristics in our analysis as they also vary widely with corporate governance.
Tables 3 through 5 present descriptive statistics based on unwinsorized data. In the regression analysis, however, we winsorize all variables at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles to reduce the impact of outliers and potential data errors on our results. 
Empirical results
Main results
Our main research question looks at the effect of country-level corporate governance on abnormal returns after insider purchases. Table 6 provides regression results with cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over 6, 11, and 101 days starting on the transaction day as the dependent variable. The impact of shareholder protection on CARs is estimated using the country-level anti-self-dealing index but we also control for a set of transaction-level and firmlevel characteristics. In short, we estimate the following regression model:
where CAR ijc is the cumulated abnormal return for transaction i in company j located in country c. ASDindex c is our main variable of interest measuring the effect of country-level shareholder protection against expropriation by corporate insiders. X ijc is a vector of transaction and firm characteristics that includes the (log of) transaction value (in USD), past return, market-to-book ratio, (log of) market capitalization, a dummy for multiple trades executed by a director on the same day, and an executive director dummy. 10 Finally,
YearDummy ijc is a vector of year dummy variables that controls for global factors that can affect the market reaction to all trades in a given year, but also reduces the impact of differing time coverage of our insider trading data across countries. Because the time dimension is not of a primary importance for our analysis, we do not report the estimated coefficients of the year dummies. Detailed definitions of all variables are presented in Table 2 .
All regressions are estimated with firm random effects u j . By including the firmspecific effects we control for unobservable firm characteristics that might influence the abnormal stock performance and also insiders" trading incentives and constraints within firms (Ravina and Sapienza (2010) ). 11 This approach of controlling for firm effects is supported by the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test that strongly rejects the hypothesis that error terms are independent within firms. The random effect estimation using the generalized least-squares (GLS) approach addresses the dependence of error terms within firms, while allowing us to estimate the effect of country-level corporate governance variables that by definition do not change within a firm (see also, La Porta et al. (2002) ). Moreover, we cluster standard errors of the coefficients at the firm level to reduce the bias if the firm-specific effects change over time (Petersen (2009) ).
Model 1 in Panel A shows that the coefficient of the anti-self-dealing index is positive and significant at the one-percent level. Thus, controlling for firm and transaction characteristics, the six-day cumulative abnormal return after insider purchases is larger in countries with better shareholder protection against profit diversion by insiders. The economic effect is also large. A regression specification with a dummy variable for index scores above the cross-country median (Model 2) shows that strong shareholder protection results in cumulative abnormal returns that are on average 1.1% higher compared to weak shareholder protection countries. This is a sizable economic effect given that the unconditional mean of the six-day cumulative returns in our sample is 1.4%. To make sure that our results are not driven by US observations that constitute 52% of our sample and have a high anti-self-dealing index, we re-run the regression without the US. The results reported in Model 3 show that the shareholder protection effect is strong and significant even after excluding all US transactions.
The positive and statistically significant effect of shareholder protection pertains also for the horizons of 11 and 101 days in Panels B and C. We conclude that Table 6 provides strong evidence that insider purchases are associated with higher abnormal returns in better investor protection countries.
The positive correlation between shareholder protection and abnormal returns supports both the substitution as well as the information content hypotheses. Both of the interpretations are plausible and not mutually exclusive. It is possible that insiders in stronger versus weaker shareholder protection countries feel more curbed in direct profit diversion from their firms and in order to extract some private rents engage in insider trading. In fact, the anti-selfdealing index does not incorporate any insider trading provisions and thus by construction allows space for substitution of rent extraction through insider trading. At the same time, however, outside investors in stronger shareholder protection countries might perceive insider purchases as a stronger and more precise signal of better future prospects of the firms. In what follows, we design several tests that might provide support for the substitution versus information content story. Table 7 summarizes regression results where we replace CARs with dollar abnormal profits to trading insiders defined as the corresponding CAR multiplied by the value of the purchased shares (in US dollar value). This measure should better fit the substitution story as it also reflects the number of shares insiders decide to purchase. Even though the first column supports the conjecture that shareholder protection affects significantly and positively overall insider profits for all 3 horizons, the second column shows that the effect disappears once we exclude US observations. The coefficient for the anti-self-dealing index becomes insignificant for all horizons. Moreover, our univariate statistics in the previous section are also not supportive of the substitution hypothesis. In line with the hypothesis, we would expect that insiders tend to trade more (more frequently and in higher quantities) in stronger investor protection countries in order to gain higher rents. We find that frequency of insider purchases is not significantly different for weaker versus stronger shareholder protection countries.
Moreover, insiders engage in larger transactions (both in absolute and relative term) in weaker shareholder protection countries. Also, the fraction of executive directors" transactions is larger in weaker shareholder protection countries. All these results, in our view, indicate that support in the data for the substitution hypothesis is rather weak.
Still, the results for CARs in Table 6 are very strong and robust. We believe this indicates support for the information content hypothesis: stock value appreciation to outside investors is significantly positively correlated with shareholder protection despite the fact that insiders" profits are not correlated in the same way. If it is indeed the information content hypothesis that explains the found relationship, we would expect to find that shareholder protection matters more in situations when it is more likely that insider purchases convey more information to market participants. Higher information asymmetry and consequent higher information content is more likely in smaller firms and in firms with lower analyst coverage.
Higher information content is also more likely when insiders purchase more shares. Table 8 shows results for the horizon of up to 10 trading days after insiders" purchase transactions. The essence of the reported results does not change for the other two horizons and neither when excluding US observations. 12 In Panel A of Table 8 , we compare the effect of the anti-selfdealing index across firms in the smallest, middle and largest quintile by total assets. 13 The coefficient for the anti-self-dealing index is decreasing in magnitude and significance as firm size increases indicating that shareholder protection affects abnormal returns more in smaller firms with larger information asymmetries when it is more likely that insiders" transactions convey more good news. The same pattern is present in Panels B and C: shareholder protection has a stronger effect in firms with one or two analysts and when insiders purchase a larger fraction of their firms" shares. Abnormal returns are larger in stronger shareholder protection countries and this effect is more pronounced in environments when more information is likely to flow.
The information content hypothesis proposes that insider purchases convey information to market participants. This however does not mean that insider purchases are signals of good future prospects in a pure sense: insiders do not purchase shares just to give a signal. What we believe is that insiders might purchase shares to profit, but in doing so they cannot help but signal better firm prospects. Insiders purchase shares because given their information they consider firm"s shares undervalued. Their purchases might be related to their private information and past stock returns. The fact that insiders are contrarian traders who are able to time their purchases just after significant price drops has been documented in the literature (Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jenter (2005)). For our hypothesis, it is important to show that the relationship between abnormal returns and shareholder protection is not just a reflection of insiders" contrarian trading, but that it reflects some extra information in addition to information contained in past stock returns. Table 4 shows that past returns, defined as cumulative abnormal returns over hundred days just before the transaction date, are more negative in better shareholder protection countries. Insiders are on average more contrarian in better shareholder protection countries. So it might indeed be the case that abnormal returns are larger in better shareholder protection countries only because insiders time their trades better in these countries. In our regressions, however, we control for past returns and therefore we are quite confident that undervaluation as reflected in past stock prices is not a sole cause of the significant anti-self-dealing index coefficient. The coefficient for past return is negative and highly significant indicating that insiders are indeed on average very good contrarian traders and the market reflects that when adjusting prices after insiders purchase shares.
Nevertheless, we provide one additional test in Panel A of Table 9 . We partition our data set into two subsets with observations after negative versus positive past returns. The two subsamples have very similar numbers of observations which shows that insiders purchase shares frequently also after stock price increases. Regression results for the two subsets show that the anti-self-dealing index remains significant at the one percent level in both specifications. Abnormal returns are positively correlated with shareholder protection even for purchases after stock price increases indicating that the relative undervaluation of stocks in the eyes of insiders is probably based on more than just pure contrarian strategies and the market recognizes it by larger price adjustments in better shareholder protection countries. We believe insiders take advantage of some private information that does not necessarily have to be material in the legal sense. Insiders exploit their general superior knowledge about their firm"s prospects.
14 The anti-self-dealing index remains significant even after excluding all US observations for the positive past returns subsample in Model 27. In a similar vein, Jiang and
Zaman (2010) show that the predictive ability of aggregate insider trading is due to insider"s ability to predict future cash-flow news rather than from adopting a contrarian investment strategy.
As the next step, we explore a quite interesting aspect of the anti-self-dealing index embedded in its construction. According to Djankov et al. (2008) , the overall protection of outside shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders comes from ex-ante as well as ex-post provisions. For possible related-party transactions that might harm outside shareholders but enrich the controlling shareholders, the index of ex-ante private control of self-dealing by investors summarizes approval requirements and immediate disclosures required by law before related transactions, as well as the immediate disclosures after the decision to enter into the transaction has been made. The ex-post private control of self-dealing index keeps track of the ease with which minority shareholders can obtain redress through the courts when the transaction damages the company even if all disclosure and approval requirements are met and combines proxies for ex-post disclosure and the ease of proving wrongdoing. For our sample countries, the two sub-indices have a correlation coefficient of 0.69. Panel B of Table 9 shows that both the sub-indices are significant, when included separately, but the ex-post index has a higher economic effect. 15 The higher importance of the ex-post index is confirmed in Model 30 that includes both the partial indices simultaneously.
14 Our data set includes only reported insider transactions that are most probably not based on material information. In general, insiders are careful about trading before price sensitive events. For example, Agrawal and Nasser (2011) show that insiders abstain from purchasing shares in the run-up to takeover announcements. 15 Table 9 reports only results for the horizon of 10 days after the transaction. Results of the other two horizons are very similar and are available upon request.
In fact, the ex-post anti-self-dealing index has a larger effect even when compared with the overall anti-self-dealing index (coefficient of 0.033 versus 0.024). This shows that even though both the ex-ante disclosure as well as the ex-post ease of proving wrongdoing are important for insider purchases communicating more information to outside investors, the latter factor seems to have a larger effect. Investors read into actions of insiders more in case they feel they can prove wrongdoing with more ease.
The information content hypothesis builds extensively on the idea of Roll (1988) and French and Roll (1986) as extended by Morck et al. (2000) that shareholder protection affects incorporation of firm-specific information (usually measured by the firm-specific stock price variation) into stock prices. If this is the case, we should find a similar positive effect when replacing our anti-self-dealing index with country-level firm-specific stock price variation.
Panel C of Table 9 shows that indeed the coefficient for firm-specific stock price variation is positive and significant at the one-percent level. Countries where firm-specific information is capitalized into prices are also associated with higher abnormal returns after insider purchases.
Model 32 shows that inclusion of the firm-specific variation index together with the anti-selfdealing index decreases the size of the anti-self-dealing coefficient but does not decrease its significance. Interestingly, inclusion of the ex-post anti-self-dealing index in Model 33 results in insignificant firm-specific variation coefficient indicating that shareholder protection fits the relationship better.
Robustness checks
In the previous section, we argue that our results are consistent with the information content explanation for the positive relationship between shareholder protection and abnormal returns.
Still, we have to consider and rule out some alternative explanations for the relationship. First, one can argue that our results only reflect a market efficiency effect. That is, it might be the case that markets across our sample countries are efficient to differing degrees and that their efficiency is correlated with shareholder protection and our results then only show spurious correlation. We do not believe this is the case as our sample includes only the most developed countries where stock market efficiency should be reasonably high. Moreover, it might take longer for some countries in our sample to reflect all publicly available information, but our 101 day horizon is long enough to make the effect disappear. As we still find significant differences in market reaction to insider purchase transaction after 101 days, we believe this suggests there is more information to capitalize into stock prices in stronger shareholder protection countries.
A second argument might be that even though regulation of insider trading in our sample countries is relatively comparable, enforcement of these laws might not be at par. If enforcement of insider trading is correlated with shareholder protection, the anti-self-dealing coefficient might be picking up the effect of enforcement. In fact, this is quite possible as Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) show that enforcement of insider trading has a significant positive effect on stock-price informativeness, especially in developed countries. Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) measure enforcement using a step function that switches to one after insider trading laws had been enforced in a country for the first time. We check the first case of insider trading prosecution across our sample countries. As our sample period starts as late as 2002 (and for some countries even later), all our observations appear exclusively after the first insider trading enforcement case across all countries in our sample and so insider trading enforcement is high (in the Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) sense) in all our countries.
Nevertheless, we run an additional test by including the insider trading prevalence index that measures the perception of how widespread insider trading in a given country is, and therefore it should be negatively correlated with insider trading enforcement. Even though the insider trading prevalence index affects abnormal returns negatively and significantly when included in a regression separately (not reported), it turns insignificant when included together with the anti-self-dealing index (Model 34 in Table 10 (2002) on the economic importance of law enforcement relative to law adoption.
Fourthly, we check whether our results are not driven by differences in ownership structures across countries. It is well documented that in countries with weaker investor protection corporate ownership tends to be more concentrated (La Porta et al., 1998) , and controlling shareholders typically serve as top managers (La Porta et al., 1999) . This might affect the link between investor protection and stock price reaction to insider trades as the market reacts negatively (less positively) to insiders increasing their ownership further when they are entrenched (Fidrmuc et al. (2006); McConnell et al. (2008) ). Ideally, we would like to control for ownership concentration at the firm level, but we do not have detailed ownership data for all firms in all countries in our sample. Nevertheless, we argue that ownership concentration is usually time invariant and therefore should be captured by our firm effects and clustered standard errors. In order to control for country level variation in ownership concentration that is not captured by the firm effects, we include a country-level average by La Porta et al. (2006) . Model 37 in Table 10 confirms the conjecture that the market reacts less positively to insider ownership increases in countries where ownership concentration is higher.
Still the effect of the anti-self-dealing index prevails.
Finally, we check whether the anti-self-dealing index is not picking up the effect of different executive compensation practices across countries (Fernandes et al., 2009 ). When managers receive shares or share options through their remuneration packages, they might purchase additional shares less often and only when they have very strong positive views on their firms" prospects. Table 3 reveals that the frequency of trading does not differ across countries and shareholder protection. Nevertheless, to control for a possible effect of different compensation practices we include the country-level mean of the proportion of equity incentive pay in total CEO compensation in Model 38 (Table 10 ). The effect of the ASD index becomes weaker but is still highly significant. The coefficient for equity pay is significantly positive confirming that more equity compensation increases the information contained in insider trading.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyze a unique data set of around 100,000 insider purchases from 15
European countries and the US to test whether abnormal returns after insider purchases differ across country-level investor protection environments. Our results reveal a positive relationship between shareholder protection and post-trade cumulative abnormal returns. We suggest two explanations. First, higher abnormal returns in stronger shareholder protection countries might reflect that insiders substitute direct rent extraction, that is curbed by strong shareholder protection, by insider trading profits. Second, because abnormal returns measure the firm value adjustments as perceived by outside investors, insider purchases might convey more information to outside shareholders when shareholders are more protected against expropriation. Market participants are willing to trade on more firm-specific information because they are protected by law from insider self-dealing. Our results show more support for the latter explanation -the information content hypothesis. We show that the positive effect of the anti-self-dealing index is not solely due to insiders" contrarian strategies and is stronger in situations when insiders are more likely to signal more information: in smaller firms, firms with lower analyst following and when insiders purchase more shares. Interestingly, decomposition of the overall anti-self-dealing index into the ex-ante and ex-post component indicates that the ex-post protection in form of ease to prove wrong doing is more important for stronger market reaction to insider purchases.
Our results seem to favor the information content perspective (John and Lang (1991)) based on the notion that insider trades reveal private information to the market and contribute to prices better reflecting fundamental firm values (Manne (1966); Leland (1992) ). In line with Morck et al. (2000) we argue that insider actions are less transparent and less credible in weak investor protection environments, where larger risks of profit diversion discourage outside investors from acting upon firm-specific information. In general, this paper provides evidence that good corporate governance contributes to higher price informativeness. We show that better investor protection improves incorporation of information into stock prices leading to stock prices better reflecting fundamental firm values.
In the course of this study we uncover that insider trading patterns differ across countries. It would be interesting to shed more light on the factors that determine the volume and frequency of insider trading across different institutional settings. Such an analysis would complement findings of this study and could enrich our understanding of the role that trading by corporate insiders plays in stock markets across the globe. Numerical measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against self-dealing by corporate insiders. Average of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing. Considers a fixed self-dealing transaction, and then measures the hurdles that the controlling shareholder must jump in order to get away with this transaction. Measures the intensity of regulation of self-dealing along a variety of dimensions, covering private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation. Source: Djankov et al. (2008) .
High ASD A dummy variable equal to one if a country"s ASD index is above the cross-country median value of the index, and zero otherwise.
Ex-ante ASD index A building block of the overall anti-self-dealing index defined above emphasizing approval requirements and immediate disclosures required by law before related transactions, as well as disclosures followed immediately after the decision to enter into related transactions has been made. Source: Djankov et al. (2008) .
Ex-post ASD index A building block of the overall anti-self-dealing index defined above that keeps track of the ease with which minority shareholders can obtain redress through courts when the transaction damages the company even if all disclosure and approval requirements are met. It combines proxies for ex post disclosure and the ease of proving wrongdoing. Source:
Firm-specific variation A country-level variable that reports time-series means of the median relative firm-specific stock return variation estimated using an international two-factor model for US dollar excess returns across all firms for each country in each year over 1980 -2003 . Source: Fernandes and Ferreira (2009 .
Insider trading prevalence
A measure of insider trading, which ranges from one (low level of insider trading) to seven (high level of insider trading) as provided by the World Economic Forum through its Global Competitiveness Report. Source: Fernandes and Ferreira (2009).
Rule of law
Measures the extent to which governmental authority is legitimately exercised only in accordance with written, publicly disclosed laws adopted and enforced in accordance with established procedure. The principle is intended to be a safeguard against arbitrary governance. Rule of law includes agents' perceptions of the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. The data averages rule of law estimates for the year 2004. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2007) .
MAD adoption A dummy variable equal to one for trades executed after the Market Abuse Directive was adopted in the given country, and zero otherwise. Total assets For each transaction calculated as the most recent (as of transaction date) reported value of assets, converted to USD using the daily exchange, and reported in millions. The natural logarithm of the variable is used in the regressions. Sources: Compustat, Datastream.
Market capitalization Calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price on the transaction date. The variable is converted to USD using the daily exchange rate sourced from Datastreamn and reported in millions. In the regressions the natural logarithm of the variable is used. Sources: CRSP, Compustat, Datastream. Number of analysts The number of earnings estimates in the month prior to annual earnings announcements, measured for the most recent year before the transaction. For companies not included in the IBES files it is assumed to be zero In the regression the following transformation of the variable is used: the natural logarithm of (1 + the number of analysts). Source: IBES.
Transaction value Calculated by multiplying the reported number of shares traded by the reported transaction price. The variable is converted to USD using the daily exchange rate sourced from Datastream, and reported in thousands. In the regressions the natural logarithm of the variable is used. Sources: primary insider trading data, see Table 1 .
Relative value Calculated as the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding. Sources: primary insider trading data, see Table 1 , Compustat, Datastream.
Past return Daily abnormal stock returns cumulated over the window (-100, -1) relative to the transaction date. Daily abnormal stock returns are calculated by deducting the daily return on the respective market index from the daily stock return. Sources of primary data: CRSP, Datastream.
Multiple trades Equals one if a director executes more than one trade on the same day and zero otherwise. Source: primary insider trading data.
Executive director Equals one if at least one executive director purchases shares on the given day and zero otherwise. Source: primary insider trading data. The table presents descriptive statistics on stock purchases by corporate insiders in 15 European countries and the US. Total # of trades is the total number of purchase transactions in our data set for the given country. Total # of firms is the number of firms with at least one transaction over the whole period that a country is in our data set. Time coverage is the number of months for which we have insider trading data for a country (see , Table 1 for details). Avg # of trades per firm per year is calculated as the total number of trades divided by the total number of firms, divided by the number of months for which the data for the given country are available, and multiplied by 12. Avg # of trades per listed firm per year is calculated as the total number of trades divided by the average number of listed firms in the country over the sample period, divided by the number of months for which the data for the given country are available, and multiplied by 12. Transaction value is calculated as the reported number of shares traded multiplied by the reported transaction price expressed in USD using the daily exchange rate. Relative transaction value is the transaction value divided by the firm"s market capitalization. Trades by executives are transactions by insiders holding executive positions as a fraction of all transactions expressed in percentage. Anti-self-dealing (ASD) index is a measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against self-dealing by corporate insiders as defined in Djankov et al. (2008 
CAR ijc is the abnormal return cumulated over 6 days in Panel A, 11 days in Panel B, and 101 days in Panel C relative to the transaction date, respectively. ASDindex c is the country-level anti-self-dealing index. X ijc is a vector of transaction and firm characteristics. All variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Observations with negative market-to-book ratio are dropped. All models in the last column report results when excluding all US observations. Coefficients for the year dummies are not reported.
*** , ** and * denote the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Sources and time coverage of insider trading data are presented in Table 1 and definitions of the variables in Table 2 
Profit ijc is the total value of shares purchased (in US dollar thousands) multiplied by the abnormal return cumulated over 6 days in Panel A, 11 days in Panel B, and 101 days in Panel C relative to the transaction date, respectively. ASDindex c is the country-level anti-self-dealing index. X ijc is a vector of transaction and firm characteristics. Relative transaction value is scaled by 0.001. All variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Observations with negative market-to-book ratio are dropped. The second column reports results when excluding all US observations. Coefficients for the year dummies are not reported. *** , ** and * denote the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Sources and time coverage of insider trading data are presented in Table  1 and definitions of the variables in Table 2 
CAR ijc is the total abnormal return cumulated over 11 days relative to the transaction date. ASDindex c is the country-level anti-selfdealing index. X ijc is a vector of transaction and firm characteristics. Small, medium sized and large firms indicate the smallest, middle and the largest quintile of transactions according to the total assets of their firms, respectively. Small, medium and large transactions indicate the smallest, middle and the largest quintile of firms according to the relative size of the transactions, respectively. All variables except the ASD index are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Observations with negative marketto-book ratio are dropped. Coefficients for the year dummies are not reported. *** , ** and * denote the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Sources and time coverage of insider trading data are presented in Table 1 and definitions of the variables in Table 2 CAR ijc is the abnormal return cumulated over 11 days relative to the transaction date. ASDindex c is the country-level anti-selfdealing index. In Panel B, it includes also the ex-ante and ex-post anti-self-dealing index in some specifications. OTHERindex c is the country-level firm-specific stock price variation in Panel C. X ijc is a vector of transaction and firm characteristics. Negative (positive) past return indicates all transactions with negative (positive) cumulative abnormal returns over hundred days just before the purchase transactions. Model 27 excludes all US observations. All variables except the indices are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Observations with negative market-to-book ratio are dropped. Coefficients for the year dummies are not reported.
*** , ** and * denote the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Sources and time coverage of insider trading data are presented in Table 1 and definitions of the variables in Table 2 This figure presents plots of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for insider purchases over the window (-20,20) relative to the transaction date. Abnormal returns are market adjusted. The CAARs are calculated for individual countries and the plots are grouped according to the level of Anti-self-dealing (ASD) index, a measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against selfdealing by corporate insiders as defined in Djankov et al. (2008) . A country is classified as having a high ASD index if its index score is above the cross-country median value, and as having a low ASD index otherwise. 
